Recurrent neural networks (RNNs) have emerged as an effective representation of control policies in sequential decision-making problems. However, a major drawback in the application of RNN-based policies is the difficulty in providing formal guarantees on the satisfaction of behavioral specifications, e.g. safety and/or reachability. By integrating techniques from formal methods and machine learning, we propose an approach to automatically extract a finite-state controller (FSC) from an RNN, which, when composed with a finite-state system model, is amenable to existing formal verification tools. Specifically, we introduce an iterative modification to the so-called quantized bottleneck insertion technique to create an FSC as a randomized policy with memory. For the cases in which the resulting FSC fails to satisfy the specification, verification generates diagnostic information. We utilize this information to either adjust the amount of memory in the extracted FSC or perform focused retraining of the RNN. While generally applicable, we detail the resulting iterative procedure in the context of policy synthesis for partially observable Markov decision processes (POMDPs), which is known to be notoriously hard. The numerical experiments show that the proposed approach outperforms traditional POMDP synthesis methods by 3 orders of magnitude within 2% of optimal benchmark values.
Introduction
Research in the reinforcement and supervised learning communities has demonstrated the utility of recurrent neural networks (RNNs) in synthesizing control policies in domains that exhibit temporal behavior [Tsoi and Back, 1997; Bakker, 2001; Heess et al., 2015] . The internal memory states of RNNs, such as in long short-term memory (LSTM) architectures [Hochreiter and Schmidhuber, 1997] , effectively account for temporal behavior by capturing the history from sequential information [Pascanu et al., 2014] . * Contact Authors Furthermore, in applications that suffer from incomplete information, RNNs leverage history to act as either a state or value estimator [Sørensen, 1997; Wierstra et al., 2007] or as a control policy [Hausknecht and Stone, 2015] .
In safety-critical systems such as autonomous vehicles, policies that are guaranteed to prevent unsafe behavior are necessary. We seek to provide formal guarantees for policies represented by RNNs with respect to temporal logic [Pnueli, 1977] or reward specifications. Such a verification task is, in general, hard due to the complex, often non-linear, structures of RNNs [Mulder et al., 2015] . Existing work directly employs satisfiability-modulo-theories (SMT) or mixed-integer linear program (MILP) solvers [Akintunde et al., 2019] , however, such methods not only scale exponentially in the number of variables but also rely on constructions using only rectified linear units (ReLUs) .
We take an iterative and model-based approach, summarized in Fig. 1 .
In particular, we extract a policy in the form of a so-called finite-state controller (FSC) [Poupart and Boutilier, 2003 ] from a given RNN. First, we employ a modification of a discretization technique called quantized bottleneck insertion, introduced in [Koul et al., 2019] . Basically, the discretization facilitates a mapping of the continuous memory structure of the RNN to a pre-defined number of discrete memory states and transitions of an FSC.
However, this standalone FSC is not sufficient to prove meaningful properties. The proposed approach relies on the exact behavior a policy induces on a specific application, e.g. construction of verifiable policies for partially observable Markov decision processes (POMDPs).We apply the extracted FSC directly to a formal model, e.g. a POMDP that represents such an application. The resulting restricted model is amenable for efficient verification techniques that check whether a specification is satisfied [Baier and Katoen, 2008] .
If the specification does not hold, verification methods typically provide diagnostic information on critical parts of the model in the form of so-called counterexamples. We propose to utilize such counterexamples to identify improvements in the extracted FSC or in the underlying RNN. First, increasing the amount of memory states in the FSC may help to approximate the behavior of the RNN more precisely [Koul et al., 2019] . Second, the RNN may actually require further training data to induce higher-quality policies for the particular application. Existing approaches rely, for example, on loss visualization [Goodfellow and Vinyals, 2015] , but we strive to exploit the information we can gain from the concrete behavior of the RNNs with respect to a formal model. Therefore, in order to decide whether more data are needed in the training of the RNN or whether first the number of memory states in the FSC should be increased, we identify those critical decisions of the current FSC that are "arbitrary". Basically, we measure the entropy [Cover and Thomas, 2012; Biondi et al., 2013] of each stochastic choice over actions the current FSC-based policy makes at critical states. That is, if the entropy is high, the decision is deemed arbitrary despite its criticality and further training is required.
We showcase the applicability of the proposed method on POMDPs. With their ability to represent sequential decisionmaking problems under uncertainty and incomplete information, these models are of particular interest in planning and control [Cassandra, 1998] . Despite their utility as a modeling formalism and recent algorithmic advances, policy synthesis for POMDPs is hard both theoretically and practically [Meuleau et al., 1999] . For reasons outlined earlier, RNNs have recently emerged as efficient policy representations for POMDPs [Hausknecht and Stone, 2015] , but the task of verifying the induced behavior is far more difficult than that for FSCs. We detail the proposed approach on POMDPs and combine the scalability and flexibility of an RNN representation with the rigor of formal verification to synthesize POMDP policies that adhere to temporal logic specifications.
We demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed synthesis approach on a set of POMDP benchmarks. These benchmarks allows for a comparison to well-known POMDP solvers, both with and without temporal logic specifications.
The numerical examples show that the proposed method (1) is more scalable, by up to 3 orders of magnitude, than wellknown POMDP solvers and (2) sults in terms of the measure of interest than other synthesis methods that extract FSCs. Related work. Closest to the proposed method is [Carr et al., 2019] , which introduced a verificationguided method to train RNNs as POMDP policies. In particular, [Carr et al., 2019] extracts polices from the RNNs but unlike the proposed method, the extracted policies do not directly exhibit the memory structure of the RNNs and were instead handcrafted based on knowledge about the particular application.
There are three lines of related research. The first one concerns the formal verification of neural network-based control policies. Two prominent approaches [Huang et al., 2017; Katz et al., 2017] for the class of feed-forward deep neural networks rely on encoding neural networks as SMT problems through adversarial examples or ReLUs architectures respectively. [Akintunde et al., 2019] concerns the direct verification of RNNs with ReLU activation functions using SMT or MILP. However, the scalability of these solver-based methods suffer from the size of the input models. We circumvent this shortcoming by our model-based approach where verification is restricted to concrete applications followed by potential improvement of the RNNs.
The second relevant direction concerns the direct synthesis of FSCs for POMDPs without neural networks. For example, [Meuleau et al., 1999] uses a branch-andbound method to compute optimal FSCs for POMDPs. [Chatterjee et al., 2016] uses a SAT-based approach to compute FSCs for qualitative properties. [Junges et al., 2018] constructs an FSC using parameter synthesis for Markov chains.
Third, existing work that concerns the extraction of FSCs from neural networks [Zeng et al., 1993; Weiss et al., 2018; Finnegan and Song, 2017; Michalenko et al., 2019] , does not integrate with formal verification to provide guarantees for extracted policies or to generate diagnostic information.
Preliminaries
A probability distribution over a set X is a function µ :
POMDPs. A Markov decision process (MDP)
M is a tuple M = (S, Act, P) with a finite (or countably infinite) set S of states, a finite set Act of actions, and a transition probability function P : S × Act → Distr (S). The reward function for states and actions is given by r : S × Act → R. A finite path π of an MDP M is a sequence of states and actions; last(π) is the last state of π. The set of all finite paths is Paths Definition 2 (POMDP Policy). An observation-based policy for a POMDP M is a function γ : ObsSeq M fin → Distr(Act ) such that supp γ(O(π)) ⊆ Act last(π) for all π ∈ Paths M fin . Γ M z is the set of observation-based policies for M. A policy for a POMDP resolves the nondeterministic choices in the POMDP, based on the history of previous observations, by assigning distributions over actions. A memoryless observation-based policy γ ∈ Γ M z is given by γ : Z → Distr (Act), i. e., decisions are based on the current observation only. A POMDP M together with a policy γ yields an induced discrete-time Markov chain (MC) M γ . An MC does not contain any nondeterminism or partial observability.
Our definition restricts POMDP policies to finite memory, which are typically represented as FSCs.
An FSC has the observations Z as input and the actions Act as output. Upon an observation, depending on the current memory node the FSC is in, the action mapping α returns a distribution over Act followed by a change of memory nodes according to δ. FSCs are an extension of so-called Moore machines [Moore, 1956] , where the action mapping is deterministic, that is, α : N × Z → Act, and the memory update δ : N × Z → N does not depend on the choice of action.
Definition 4 (Specifications). We consider linear-time temporal logic (LTL) properties [Pnueli, 1977] . For a set of atomic propositions AP , which are either satisfied or violated by a state, and a ∈ AP , the set of LTL formulas is:
Intuitively, a path π satisfies the proposition a if its first state does; (ψ 1 ∧ψ 2 ) is satisfied, if π satisfies both ψ 1 and ψ 2 ; ¬ψ is true on π if ψ is not satisfied. The formula ψ holds on π if the subpath starting at the second state of π satisfies ψ; π satisfies ψ if all suffixes of π satisfy ψ. Finally, π satisfies (ψ 1 U ψ 2 ) if there is a suffix of π that satisfies ψ 2 and all longer suffixes satisfy ψ 1 . ♦ ψ abbreviates (true U ψ).
For POMDPs, one wants to synthesize a policy such that the probability of satisfying an LTL-property respects a given bound, denoted ϕ = P ∼λ (ψ) for ∼ ∈ {<, ≤, ≥, >} and λ ∈ [0, 1]. In addition, undiscounted expected reward properties ϕ = E ∼λ (♦ a) require that the expected accumulated cost until reaching a state satisfying a respects λ ∈ R ≥0 .
A specification ϕ is satisfied for POMDP M and γ if it is satisfied in the MC M γ (M γ |= ϕ). Policy network. We now define a general notion of an RNN that represents a POMDP policy. Definition 5 (Policy network). A policy network for a POMDP is a functionγ : ObsSeq M fin → Distr (Act). The underlying RNN which receives sequential input in the form of (finite) observation sequences from ObsSeq M fin , the output is a distribution over actions, see Fig. 4a . To be more precise, we identify the main components of such a network.
Definition 6 (Components of a policy network). A policy networkγ is sufficiently described by a hidden-state update functionδ : R × Z × Act → R and an action mapping γ h : R → Distr (Act).
Consider the following observation sequence:
The policy network receives an observation and returns an action choice. Throughout the execution of the sequence, the RNN holds a continuous hidden state h ∈ R, occasionally described as an internal memory state, which captures previous information. On each transition, this hidden state is updated to include the information of the current state and the last action taken under the hidden state transition functionδ. From the prior observation sequence in (1), the corresponding hidden state sequence would be defined as:
Additionally, the output of the policy network is expressed by the action-distribution function γ h , which maps the value of hidden state to a distribution over the actions. At internal memory states h i , we haveδ(h i , O(s i ), a i ) = h i+1 and γ h (h i+1 ) = µ(Act) for state s i on path π. Note that a policy network characterizes a well-defined POMDP policy.
Problem Statement
We attempt to solve two separate but related problems: (1) For a POMDP M, a policy networkγ and a specification ϕ, the problem is to extract an FSC Aγ ∈ Γ M z such that M Aγ |= ϕ.
(2) If the extraction process fails to produce a suitable candidate, then we improve the policy networkγ * for which we can solve (1). Fig. 2 illustrates the workflow of the proposed approach for a given POMDP M, policy networkγ and specification ϕ. We summarize the individual steps below and provide the technical details in the subsequent sections. FSC extraction. We first quantize the memory nodes of the policy networkγ, that is, we discretize the memory update of the continuous memory state h. From this discrete representation of the memory update, we construct an FSC Aγ ∈ Γ M z . The procedure has as input the number B h of neurons which defines a bound on the number of memory nodes in the FSC. Verification. We use the FSC Aγ to resolve partial information and nondeterministic choices in the POMDP M, resulting in an induced MC M Aγ . We evaluate whether the given specification ϕ is satisfied for this induced MC using a formal verification technique called model checking [Baier and Katoen, 2008] . If the specification ϕ holds, then the synthesis is complete with output policy Aγ. However, if ϕ does not hold, then we decide if we shall increase the bound B h on the number of memory nodes or if the network needs retraining. In particular, we examine whether or not the entropy over the FSC's action distribution is above a prescribed threshold. Policy improvement. In the high entropy case, we increase the discretization level, that is, we increase B h , and construct the FSC Aγ with additional memory states at its disposal. Whereas in the other case, additional memory nodes may cause the extracted FSC to be drawn from extrapolated information and we instead seek to improve the policy network. For that, we use diagnostic information in the form of counterexamples to generate new data [Carr et al., 2019] .
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Example 1. We consider the POMDP in Fig. 3 as a motivating example for the necessity of memory-based FSCs. The POMDP has three observations ("blue", s 3 and s 4 ) where observation "blue" is received upon visiting s 0 , s 1 , and s 2 . That is, the agent is unable to distinguish between these states. The specification is ϕ = Pr ≥0.9 (♦ s 3 ), so the agent is to reach state s 3 with at least probability 0.9. In a 1-FSC (i.e. one memory node 0), we can describe an FSC A 1 by: α(0, blue) = up with probability p, down with probability 1 − p, δ(0, z, a) = 0 ∀z ∈ Z, a ∈ Act.
A 2-FSC with two memory nodes (0 and 1), see Fig. 3c , allows for greater expressivity, i.e. the policy can base its decision on larger observation sequences. With this memory structure, 
Policy Extraction
In this section we describe how we adapt the method called quantized bottleneck insertion [Koul et al., 2019] to extract an FSC from a given RNN. Let us first explain the relationship between the main components of a policy network γ (Definition 6) and an FSC A (Definition 3). In particular, the hidden-state update functionδ : R×Z ×Act → R takes as input a real-valued hidden state of the policy network, while the memory update function of an FSC takes a memory node from the finite set N . The key for linking the two is therefore a mechanism that encodes the continuous hidden state h into a set N of discrete memory nodes. discrete vector space defined by {−1, 0, 1} B h . This process, illustrated in Fig. 4b , provides a mapping of the continuous hidden state h into 3 B h possible discrete values. We denote the discrete state for h byĥ and the set of all such discrete states byĤ. Note, that |Ĥ| ≤ 3 B h since not all values of the hidden state may be reached in an observation sequence. [Koul et al., 2019] has another QBN for a continuous observation space, however, we focus on discrete observations and can neglect the additional autoencoder. FSC construction. After the QBN insertion we simulate a series of executions, querying the modified RNN for action choices, on the concrete application, e.g. using a POMDP modelx. We form a dataset of consecutive pairs (ĥ t ,ĥ t+1 ) of discrete states, the action a t and the observation z t+1 that led to the transition {ĥ t , a t , z t+1 ,ĥ t+1 } at each time t during the execution of the policy network. The number of accessed memory nodes N ⊆Ĥ corresponds to the number of different discrete statesĥ ∈Ĥ in this dataset. The deterministic memory update rule δ(n t , a t , z t+1 ) = n t+1 is obtained by constructing a N × (|Z| × |Act|) transaction table, for a detailed description see [Koul et al., 2019] . We can additionally construct the action mapping α : N × Z → Distr (Act) with α(n t , z t ) = µ ∈ Distr (Act) by querying the softmax-output layer (see Fig. 4a ) for each memory state and observation.
Policy Evaluation and Improvement
Evaluation using formal verification. We assume that for POMDP M = (M , Z, O) and specification ϕ, we have an extracted FSC Aγ ∈ Γ M z as in Definition 3. We use the policy Aγ to obtain the induced MC M Aγ . For this MC, formal verification through model checking checks whether M Aγ |= ϕ and thereby provides hard guarantees about the quality of the 
Entropy of the Extracted FSC
Figure 5: Entropy of the extracted FSCs from an RNN as it is trained with more samples. For each sequence we fix the discretization, ignore the inner loop and add more samples guided by the counterexamples. Note: the behavior at the right edge of the figure is due to the fact that this represents the entropy of the entire FSC, which will differ from the entropy over the components of the counterexamples. extracted FSC Aγ regarding ϕ. Model checking provides the probability (or the expected reward) to satisfy a specification for all states s ∈ S via solving linear equation systems.
Example 1 (cont.). Consider the case in the 1-FSC A 1 (Fig. 3b) where p = 1, the probability of reaching the state s 3 in the induced MC is Pr(♦ s 3 ) = 1 3 . Clearly, the behavior induced by this 1-FSC violates the specification and formal verification provides two counterexamples of critical memory-state pairs for this policy Aγ: (0, s 0 ) and (0, s 1 ).
After model checking, if the specification does not hold, the policy may require refinement. As discussed before, on the one hand we can increase the upper bound B h on the number of memory nodes to extract a new FSC. At each iteration of the inner loop in Fig. 2 , we modify the QBN for the new, increased, level of discretization and obtain a new FSC using the process outlined in Sect 4. On the other hand, we may decide via a formal entropy check whether new data need to be generated to actually improve the policy.
Improving the policy network. Our goal is to determine whether a policy network requires more training data or not. Existing approaches in supervised learning methods leverage benchmark comparisons between a train-test set using a loss function [Baum and Wilczek, 1987] . Loss visualization, proposed by [Goodfellow and Vinyals, 2015; Yu et al., 2019] provides a set of analytical tools to show model convergence. However, such approaches are generally more suited to classes of continuous functions than the discrete representations we seek. More importantly, we want to leverage the information we gain from employing a model-based approach.
Counterexamples. We first determine a set of states that are critical for the specification under the current strategy. Consider the sequences of memory nodes and observations (n 0 , z 0 ) a0 − → · · · at−1 − −− → (n t , z t ) from the POMDP M under the FSC Aγ. For each of these sequences, we collect the states s ∈ S underlying the observations, e.g., O(s) = z i for 
As we know the probability or expected reward for these states to satisfy the specification from previous model checking, we can now directly assess their criticality regarding the specification. We collect all pairs of memory nodes and states from N × S that contain critical states and build the set Crit M Aγ ⊆ N × S that serves us as a counterexample. These pairs carry the joint information of critical states and memory nodes from the policy applied to the MC and may be formalized using a so-called product construction.
Entropy measure. The average entropy across the distributions over actions at the choices induced by Crit M Aγ is our measure of choice to determine the level of training for the policy network. Put differently, for each pair (n, s) ∈ Crit M Aγ , we collect the distribution µ ∈ Distr(Act ) over actions that Aγ returns for the observation O(s) when it is in memory node n. Then, we define the evaluation function H using the entropy H(µ) of the distribution µ:
For high values of H, the distribution is uniform across all actions and the associated policy network is likely extrapolating from unseen inputs. In Fig. 5 , we observe that when there are fewer samples and higher discretization, the extracted FSC tends to perform arbitrarily. We define the function H for the full set Crit M Aγ :
We compare the average entropy over all components of the counterexample against a threshold η ∈ [0, 1], that is, if H(Crit M Aγ ) > η, we will provide more data. Example 1 (cont.). Under the working example, the policy A 1 was the 1-FSC with p = 1 (Fig. 3b) , which produces two counterexample memory and state pairs: Crit M A1 = {(0, s 0 ), (0, s 1 )}. The procedure would then examine the policy's average entropy at these critical components (n, s) ∈ Crit M A1 , which in this trivial example is given by H(Crit M A1 ) = −p log 2 (p) − (1 − p) log 2 (1 − p) = 0 from (3). The average entropy is below a prescribed threshold, η = 0.5, and thus we increase the number of memory nodes, which results in the satisfying FSC A 2 in Fig. 3c .
Collecting new training data. To perform retraining we take a policy for the underlying MDP M that satisfies ϕ, and we use that policy to generate observation-action sequences, which are initialized at the states s in the critical set Crit M Aγ . These executions, with observations as inputs and actions as labels, form a batch for retraining the RNN policy networkγ.
Experiments
We evaluate the proposed verification and synthesis approach by comparing to a series of benchmark examples that are subject to either LTL or expected cost specifications. For both sets we compare to two synthesis tools: PRISM-POMDP [Norman et al., 2017] and Solve-POMDP [Walraven and Spaan, 2017] from the respective formal methods and planning communities. We further compare to another RNN-based synthesis procedure with a handcrafted memory structure for FSCs [Carr et al., 2019] . For proper comparison with the synthesis tools we adopt the experiment setup of [Carr et al., 2019] , whereby we always iterate for 10 instances of retraining the RNN from counterexample data. Similarly, the proposed approach is not guaranteed to reach the optimum, but shall rather improve as far as possible within 10 iterations. Implementation and Setup. We provide a Python toolchain that employs the probabilistic model checker PRISM. We train and encode the RNN policy networksγ using the deep learning library Keras. All experiments are run on a 2.3 GHz machine with a 12 GB memory limit and a maximum computation time of 10 5 seconds.
Settings. We analyze the method on three different settings: Maze(c), Grid(c) and Navigation(c), for detailed descriptions of these examples see [Norman et al., 2017] and [Carr et al., 2019] , respectively. In each of these settings the policies have an action space of the cardinal directions navigating through a grid-based environment. For the former two examples, we attempt to synthesize a policy that minimizes an expected cost subject to reaching a goal state a: E M min (♦ a). In the latter example, we seek a policy that maximizes the probability of satisfying an LTL specification, in particular avoiding obstacles X, both static and randomly moving, until reaching a target area a: P M max (¬X U a). Discussion. The results are shown in Table 1 . The proposed extraction approach scales to significantly larger exam-ples than both state-of-the-art POMDP solvers which compute near-optimal policies. While the handcrafted approach scales equally well, the extraction method produces higherquality policies -within 2% of the optimum. That effect is due to our automatic extraction of suitable FSCs. Note that an optimal policy for Maze(1) can be expressed using 2 memory states. The FSC structure employed by the handcrafted method uses this structure and consequently, for the small Maze environments, the handcrafted method synthesizes higher values. Yet, with larger environments the fixed memory structure produces poor policies as more memory states are beneficial to account for the past behavior.
